Is the Experimental Auction a Dynamic Market? by Jay R. Corrigan
Is the Experimental Auction a Dynamic Market?
JAY R. CORRIGAN*
Department of Economics, Kenyon College, Gambier, OH 43022, USA (e-mail: corriganj@
kenyon.edu)
Accepted 18 November 2004
Abstract. Experimental auctions are generally thought of as static markets. This paper pre-
sents the results of an experimental auction designed to test whether participants’ perceptions
regarding the relative diﬃculty of delaying or reversing a transaction outside the experimental
market systematically aﬀect their willingness-to-pay bids. The results show that auction par-
ticipants’ perceptions signiﬁcantly impact their bids in a manner that is consistent with real
option theory. These results suggest that economists must be careful to consider the existence
of outside markets when designing experimental auctions.
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1. Introduction
Experimental auctions are now widely used in most ﬁelds of economics.
Economists have, for example, used auctions to study the disparity between
willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept payment (WTA)
(Kahneman et al. 1990; Shogren et al. 1994), to estimate the value individ-
uals place on risk reduction (Shogren and Crocker 1994), and to estimate the
eﬀects of market power in markets with few sellers (Davis and Williams
1991). Experimental auctions are perhaps most popular in estimating the
value of new products or product traits, such as new packaging techniques
(Hoﬀman et al. 1993), meat tenderness (Lusk 2001), and foods containing
genetically modiﬁed ingredients (Rousu et al. 2004a).
These auctions are typically thought of as taking place in a static setting, in
which case WTP is simply equivalent to the compensating variation (CV). The
real world, however, is dynamic. If participants think of the experimental
auction as part of a larger dynamic market, the equivalence between WTP and
CV breaks down. WTP is instead equal to CV plus some dynamic component.
Depending on auction participants’ beliefs regarding the dynamic aspects of
the market they are participating in, their WTP bids may either over- or
understate their CV.
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Environmental & Resource Economics (2005) 31: 35–45  Springer 2005Several studies have argued that if auction participants believe the good up
for auction can be purchased outside of the auction market for some price p,
bids will be censored at or near p (Harrison 1992; Kolstad and Guzman 1999;
Harrison et al. 2004). Cherry et al. (2004) ﬁnd this to be the case in both
hypothetical and real auctions for induced value tokens. Zhao and Kling
(2001, 2004) and Kling et al. (2003) go further, developing a model based on
real option theory that shows that individuals’ perceptions regarding their
outside options may lead to WTP bids that either over- or understate their
true valuation of a good.
In this paper, I report the results of an experimental auction designed
to test whether WTP bids submitted in an experimental auction are sys-
tematically inﬂuenced by participants’ perceptions regarding the relative
diﬃculty of delaying or reversing a transaction. I ﬁnd that these percep-
tions do in fact signiﬁcantly aﬀect WTP. This suggests that experimental
auctions may not be static markets. Thus, ignoring the dynamic aspects
inherent to these auctions may lead to misinterpretation of the resulting
data. My results also have implications for the design of experimental
auctions. For example, I show that seemingly equivalent demand revealing
auction designs would not be expected to yield the same results if par-
ticipants do indeed view the auctions as taking place within a larger dy-
namic market setting.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the related theo-
retical literature. In Section 3, I lay out the design of an experimental auction
intended to test whether participants’ perceptions regarding the relative dif-
ﬁculty of delaying or reversing a transaction aﬀect their WTP bids. Section 4
contains a discussion of the empirical results, which shows that these per-
ceptions signiﬁcantly aﬀect WTP. Conclusions follow in Section 5.
2. Theoretical Background
In order to better understand the dynamic nature of experimental auctions, I
analyze participants’ bidding behavior within the framework of the ‘‘com-
mitment cost model’’ developed by Zhao and Kling (2001, 2004) and Kling
et al. (2003). According to this model, if an agent faces uncertainty, the
potential for future learning, and the possibility of limited reversal or limited
delay, then the agent’s WTP for a good in the current period is a function of
both the good’s expected value and a pair of option values. The ﬁrst option
value is associated with delaying the transaction, the second with immediate
purchase.
Given that the above conditions are met, delaying a transaction may allow
the potential buyer to avoid a purchase that would yield negative surplus.
Therefore, in order to commit to the purchase now and forgo future learning
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a lower price than the one she would have been willing to pay in the absence
of future learning. The diﬀerence between these two WTP ﬁgures is the op-
tion value associated with delay.
1 There is also an option value associated
with buying today, since this may allow the participant to sell the good for a
proﬁt at some future date. Thus, in a dynamic setting, the participant’s WTP
is not simply equal to CV, but is equal to CV plus a dynamic component
made up of the diﬀerence between these two option values. Kling et al. (2003)
developed a simple model of WTP incorporating the paired option values
associated with any transaction made in a dynamic, uncertain setting. The
authors show that the participant’s willingness to pay can be written as
WTP ¼ CV þ OV
Buy   OV
Delay; ð1Þ
where CV is the compensating variation, OV
Buy is the option value associ-
ated with immediate purchase, and OV
Delay is the option value associated
with delaying the transaction. Which of these option values is greater de-
pends on the good’s market price, the agent’s own valuation of the good, and
the perceived relative costs of purchasing or selling the item in the future.
Other things being equal, an auction participant who perceives the cost
associated with delaying the purchase to be greater than the cost associated
with reversing it will submit a higher bid than a participant who believes
reversal is relatively more costly. Thus, understanding a participant’s per-
ceptions regarding the relative diﬃculty of reversal versus delay is crucial in
understanding whether her WTP bid is an over- or understatement of her
CV.
Results from a ﬁeld experiment conducted by Kling et al. (2003) show that
WTP for sportscards at a sportscard convention is aﬀected by the buyers’
perceptions regarding the relative diﬃculty of reversal and delay in a manner
that is consistent with the commitment cost model.
2 This is reassuring but not
terribly surprising given that the transactions were taking place in a real,
well-functioning, dynamic market setting. In order to understand whether
dynamic perceptions aﬀect WTP bids submitted in experimental auctions (a
market environment typically thought of as static), it is necessary to gauge
the eﬀects of participants’ perceptions on bids submitted within the conﬁnes
of the experimental auction.
3. Experimental Design
Participants in this study were recruited from ‘Principles of Economics’
course at Iowa State University during the spring of 2002.
3 Thirty students
took part in each of two experimental units, for a total of sixty participants.
Each student received $15 for participating.
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4 During the ﬁrst step, participants read
along as the monitor read the instructions aloud. These instructions con-
tained a brief introduction to the experiment, as well as a detailed description
of the workings of the random nth-price auction (Shogren et al. 2001). The
monitor also went over an example auction on the blackboard and admin-
istered a short quiz to test participants’ understanding of the auction
mechanism. The instructions borrowed their description of the auction
mechanism from Shogren et al. (2001).
The second step was a non-binding practice auction for a dollar bill. This
auction was intended to further familiarize participants with the auction
mechanism. The monitor collected the bids and ranked them on the black-
board, then announced the randomly-determined nth price.
5 Participants
were then informed that, had this been a real round, anyone who submitted a
bid above the nth price would buy a dollar bill.
During step three, the monitor informed participants that the following
two auction rounds would be for Iowa State University-logo coﬀee mugs, but
that only one of the two rounds would be binding, and that the binding
round would be determined by a coin ﬂip after both rounds had been
completed.
In step four, participants inspected the mugs being auctioned oﬀ and
submitted a bid indicating their maximum WTP for such a mug. The mugs
were clearly marked with a bookstore price tag ($5.95). In diﬀerent experi-
ments, Kahneman et al. (1990) auctioned oﬀ coﬀee mugs with and without
price tags and foundsimilar results in bothcases. Ichose to leavetheprice tags
on the mugs in order to eliminate uncertainty about the mugs’ outside market
price. After submitting their bids, participants completed a survey designed to
collect data about their age, gender, and income, as well as their perceptions
regarding the relative diﬃculty of selling or buying the mug outside of the
experiment. Upon completion, the monitor collected these surveys.
During step ﬁve, participants submitted a second bid indicating their
maximum WTP for the mug. After submitting these bids, they completed a
second perceptions survey similar to the ﬁrst, but excluding questions on age,
gender, and income. The monitor collected these surveys once all participants
had completed them.
6
In step six, the monitor determined the binding round by ﬂipping a coin.
After announcing the result of the coin ﬂip, the monitor ranked the bids from
the binding round on the blackboard, and determined and announced the
random nth price. Participants were informed that if they had submitted a
bid above this price, they would purchase a mug at the nth price. Participants
were then paid $15 for participating, and any transactions agreed to were
carried out.
In the context of this study, the commitment cost model predicts that bids
submitted by participants who believe that selling outside the experiment is
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regression designed to test for the eﬀects these perceptions have on WTP.
Examination of the data shows that participants’ perceptions of the market’s
dynamic features have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on their WTP bids.
Table I presents the summary statistics from the practice auction and the
ﬁrst potentially binding auction round. Table II reports mean WTP bids
conditional on participants’ reported perceptions of the relative diﬃculty of
reversal versus delay. As predicted, buyers who perceived reversal (i.e., selling
the good outside of the experiment) to be more diﬃcult than delay (i.e.,
buying the good outside of the experiment) submitted bids signiﬁcantly lower
than buyers who perceived reversal to be easier than delay ($2.26 versus
$3.86, t ¼ 2:15).
To further assess the results, I also use regression analysis to estimate
WTP as a function of participants’ perceptions. I consider the following
speciﬁcation:
Table I. WTP bid descriptive statistics (n = 60)
Mean Median Standard deviation
Dollar Bill 0.97 0.99 0.42
Coﬀee Mug 2.42 2.00 1.75
Table II. The eﬀects of perceived diﬀerences in relative reversal and delay diﬃculty
Perceived relative diﬃculty Mean bid Observations
Reversal Diﬃculty 2.26 43
>Delay Diﬃculty (1.72)
a
Reversal Diﬃculty 2.26 11
= Delay Diﬃculty (1.76)
Reversal Diﬃculty 3.86 6
<Delay Diﬃculty (1.58)
aNumbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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where ei is a mean-zero error term, and Relativei is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between participant i’s perceived diﬃculty of selling later and her perceived




SellDifficultyi   BuyDifficultyi ðÞ ; ð3Þ
where both SellDifficultyi and BuyDifficultyi are self-reported measures
ranging from 1 (very easy) to 5 (almost impossible).
7 If, for example, par-
ticipant i reports that she believes that selling outside the experiment would
be almost impossible but that buying would be very easy, then Relativei ¼ 1.
The estimate of bRelative reported in Table III is signiﬁcantly less than zero
(t ¼  2:49). This suggests that potential buyers who believe selling later
(reversal) will be more diﬃcult than buying later (delay) tend to bid signiﬁ-
cantly less than those who believe selling later will be relatively easy.
8 This
relationship can also be seen in Figure 1 which plots participants’ bids versus
their perceptions regarding the relative diﬃculty of reversal and delay. These
ﬁndings strongly suggest that WTP bids submitted in experimental auctions
contain a dynamic component, even when participants are bidding on a
familiar good whose outside market price is known.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Auctions conducted in an experimental setting are often the most convenient
way to estimate consumers’ willingness to pay for new products or product
traits. For example, experimental auctions have been used to estimate con-
sumers’ valuation of new packaging techniques (Hoﬀman et al. 1993), irra-
diated meat (Hayes et al. 1995; Fox et al. 2002), meat tenderness (Lusk
2001), and food safety information provided by environmental groups







aNumbers in parentheses are t statistics.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
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taking place in a static market, uncertainty and the potential for delay and/or
reversal are often inherent and inescapable aspects of these markets. If this is
the case, researchers may not be estimating compensating variation (which is,
presumably, what they are interested in), but compensating variation plus a
dynamic component made up of the diﬀerence between option values asso-
ciated with delay and reversal.
To understand how the existence of such option values might aﬀect the
results of experimental auctions, consider two similar techniques for esti-
mating the value of some new product trait. Economists often estimate WTP
for a new trait either by endowing auction participants with a conventional
product and then giving them the opportunity to bid to upgrade to a product
possessing the trait of interest (e.g., Shogren et al. 1994, 2000; Lusk 2001), or
by eliciting WTP bids for both products separately and then taking the dif-
ference between the two bids (e.g., Noussair et al. 2002, 2004; Rousu et al.
2004a, 2004b). While in a static setting either of these techniques should yield
unbiased estimates of the value participants place on the new product trait,
both techniques may either over- or understate the trait’s value in a dynamic
setting.
9
For example, suppose two products are being sold in an experimental
auction: conventional farm-raised salmon and salmon which has been farm
raised in accordance with the USDA’s organic labeling requirements. As-
sume it is common knowledge that the costs associated with reselling either
product outside the auction are prohibitively high, and that while it is
impossible to purchase organic farm-raised salmon outside of the auction
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Figure 1. Bids submitted versus reported relative diﬃculty.
IS THE EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION A DYNAMIC MARKET? 41supermarket. Under these conditions, if the experimenter endows partici-
pants with one pound of conventional salmon and then allows them to bid
to exchange that for one pound of organic salmon, WTP bids would be
simply equal to the diﬀerence between participants’ CV for each product.
That is,
Bid ¼ CVOrg   CVCon; ð4Þ
where CVOrg is that associated with organic farm-raised salmon and
CVCon is that associated with the conventional farm-raised variety. Given
the participants’ beliefs, bidding can truly be thought of as taking place in
a static setting because participants cannot delay or reverse the transac-
tion.
Alternatively, if the experimenter endows participants with nothing, but
gives them the opportunity to place separate bids for both types of salmon,
the new product trait’s value would be calculated by taking the diﬀerence
between the two bids. That is,
BidOrg   BidCon ¼ CVOrg  








Con is the option value associated with delaying the purchase of
the conventional salmon. Since it can be shown that OV
Delay
Con is nonneg-
ative, the value of the new trait will be overestimated if the valuation
process is indeed dynamic. And since even participants who regularly buy
salmon outside the experimental environment may not know the current
market price, delaying any purchase until they can ﬁnd out more about
the product’s price outside the experiment will allow them to avoid
overpaying today (Kolstad and Guzman 1999). Thus, if the cost associated
with delaying the purchase of conventional salmon is thought to be suf-
ﬁciently low, OV
Delay
Con may be positive even if participants are certain
about the value they would derive from consuming the conventional sal-
mon.
Given this set of assumptions about the potential for outside reversal and
delay, an experimenter interested in estimating only the value participants
place on the organic-label trait should endow the participants with the
conventional salmon and then allow them to bid to upgrade.
It is also important to note that it is the perceived relative diﬃculty of
delay and reversal that determine the magnitude of the dynamic component.
In the above example, if a participant incorrectly believed that organic farm-
raised salmon could be purchased outside the experimental auction, her bid
to upgrade to organic salmon if she were endowed with conventional farm-
raised salmon would be




  CVCon: ð6Þ
JAY R. CORRIGAN 42Since it can be shown that OV
Delay
Org is nonnegative, this design could lead to
an underestimate of the trait’s value. In this example, it is imperative that
participants accurately perceive the market’s dynamic characteristics.
In this paper, I have discussed an experimental auction designed to test
whether participants’ WTP for a familiar good is aﬀected by their perceptions
of the experimental market’s dynamic aspects. I ﬁnd that potential buyers’
perceptions regarding the relative diﬃculty of outside reversal and delay do
signiﬁcantly aﬀect WTP. Speciﬁcally, participants who believe delaying a
transaction will be relatively diﬃcult, submit bids signiﬁcantly higher than
participants who believe delay will be relatively easy. These results suggest
that researchers designing experimental auctions must recognize that those
auctions may in fact be taking place within a larger dynamic market setting.
It is also important that auction participants have an accurate understanding
of the market setting’s dynamic aspects.
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Notes
1. Strictly speaking, this diﬀerence is not an option value but a commitment cost. An option
value refers to a one-time wealth transfer, whereas a commitment cost refers to a perma-
nent change in price. However, since the option value concept is much more widely known,
in this paper I adopt the naming convention used in Kling et al. (2003), and refer to the
diﬀerence as an option value.
2. For counter results, see Lusk (2003).
3. In order to avoid problems associated with participants behaving in such a way as to please
their instructor, the instructors of these courses were in no way involved with this research
and were not present when the experimental auctions were conducted.
4. The complete instructions given to participants are available from the author upon request.
5. To determine the nth price the monitor ﬁrst ranks participants’ bids from highest to
lowest, then randomly selects a number between 2 and N (where N is the number of
participants). The bid corresponding to that number is the nth price. By separating what
participants bid from what they pay if they win the auction, the random nth-price
auction mechanism preserves the demand-revealing properties of the Vickrey auction.
Shogren et al. (2001) show that the random nth-price auction outperforms the Vickrey
auction mechanism in motivating oﬀ-margin bidders to bid their true valuation in an
auction for induced value tokens.
6. The results from the second potentially binding auction round were used as part of a
diﬀerent study focusing on WTA–WTP disparity and are not discussed in this paper.
7. The format of these questions was similar to that used by Kling et al. (2003).
8. A similar regression that included participants’ age, gender, and income yielded qualita-
tively similar results. In particular, the coeﬃcient bRelative was still negative and signiﬁcant
IS THE EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION A DYNAMIC MARKET? 43at the 0.05 level (t ¼  2:07). Of the coeﬃcients associated with the socioeconomic vari-
ables, only the income coeﬃcient was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (t ¼ 2:51).
9. For further discussion of how initial endowments aﬀect WTP bids in experimental auctions
see Corrigan and Rousu (2004) and Lusk et al. (2004).
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